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We describe an approximate dynamic programming (ADP) approach to compute approximately optimal
strategies and approximations of the minimal losses that can be guaranteed in discounted repeated games
with vector losses. At the core of our approach is a characterization of the lower Pareto frontier of the set of
expected losses that a player can guarantee in these games as the unique fixed point of a set-valued dynamic
programming (DP) operator. This fixed point can be approximated by an iterative application of this DP
operator compounded by a polytopic set approximation, beginning with a single point. Each iteration can
be computed by solving a set of linear programs corresponding to the vertices of the polytope. We derive
rigorous bounds on the error of the resulting approximation and the performance of the corresponding
approximately optimal strategies.
We discuss an application to regret minimization in repeated decision-making in adversarial environ-
ments, where we show that this approach can be used to compute approximately optimal strategies and
approximations of the minimax optimal regret when the action sets are finite. We illustrate this approach
by computing provably approximately optimal strategies for the problem of prediction using expert advice
under discounted {0,1}−losses. Our numerical evaluations demonstrate the sub-optimality of well-known
off-the-shelf online learning algorithms like Hedge and a significantly improved performance on using our
approximately optimal strategies in these settings. Our work thus demonstrates the significant potential in
using the ADP framework to design effective online learning algorithms.
Key words : Vector Repeated Games, Approximate Dynamic Programming, Online learning
1. Introduction.
In several decision-making scenarios in uncertain and potentially adversarial environments, a
decision-maker cares about multiple objectives at the same time. For example, in certain defense
operations, an agent might be interested in simultaneously defending multiple targets against an
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enemy. In a repeated game against an unknown opponent, a player may want to perform well
relative to each strategy in some given class, in hindsight. In asymmetric information games where
a player lacks some information that other players have, a natural approach for the player is to
choose a strategy that gives appropriate worst-case guarantees simultaneously across the different
underlying possibilities. One can model many such scenarios as a vector-valued sequential game
between the agent and an adversary.
In this paper, we focus on a simple class of such sequential games that has been successful in
modeling many applications [10, 6, 38, 1]: two-player repeated games with vector-valued losses.
For the case where the losses are discounted over time, we describe an approximate dynamic pro-
gramming (ADP) approach for approximating the lower Pareto frontier of the set of upper bounds
on expected losses that a player can simultaneously guarantee across the different dimensions. In
other words, for a fixed player, our approach approximates the lower Pareto frontier of the set of
all points b ∈ RK , such that the player can guarantee that the expected losses in the game are
contained in the lower corner set {x ∈ RK : x≤ b}. An extension to general convex polytopes of
the form {x ∈RK :Ax≤ b} follows by considering games with appropriate linear transformations
of the vector losses.
At the core of our approach is a characterization of this optimal Pareto frontier as the unique fixed
point of a set-valued dynamic programming (DP) operator, which also simultaneously characterizes
the strategies that achieve its different points. This result follows by showing that the DP operator
is a contraction in an appropriately defined metric on the space of Pareto frontiers of convex and
compact sets. This novel metric may be of independent interest. Using this characterization, we
propose an approximation scheme that starts with a single point and iteratively applies the DP
operator compounded by an appropriately designed polytopic set approximation. Each iteration
can be implemented by solving a finite set of linear programs corresponding to the vertices of the
polytope. We derive rigorous bounds on the approximation error and on the performance of the
approximately optimal policies resulting from this scheme.
We discuss an application of our approach to the problem of regret minimization in repeated
decision-making in adversarial environments, also known as the framework of “online learning”.
This framework for decision-making under uncertainty has enjoyed wide popularity both in theory
and in practice. The key notion is that of “regret”, defined as the difference between the loss
incurred by the decision-maker’s choice of actions, and the loss incurred by the best fixed action
that could have been chosen in hindsight against the sequence of actions chosen by the environment.
In settings where losses are discounted over time and action sets are finite, our approach yields
a procedure to compute approximations of the minimax optimal regret and simple approximately
optimal strategies.
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As an illustration, we use our approach to compute near-optimal strategies for the problem of
prediction using expert advice with discounted losses. Our numerical evaluations show that these
strategies can lead to significant gains over standard off-the-shelf online learning algorithms like
Hedge (also known as Multiplicative Weights), which in some cases incur regrets that significantly
exceed the upper bounds on the optimal regret that we compute. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first class of provably near-optimal strategies for this setting. These results suggest the
significant potential in using ADP approaches to designing effective online learning algorithms.
1.1. Related literature
Blackwell [10] pioneered the study of two-player vector-valued repeated games under the long-run
average loss criterion. He described necessary and sufficient conditions for any convex set of loss
vectors to be approachable by a player, which means that there exists a strategy for the player
that ensures that the long-run average loss approaches this set almost surely regardless of the
adversary’s actions. He also defined an adaptive randomized strategy that ensures this. Further,
he proved the following remarkable “minimax” theorem: any convex set is either approachable by
the player or is excludable by the adversary, which means that the adversary has a strategy that
ensures that the long-run average loss remains outside this set almost surely. These initial results
established the now well known “approachability” framework to analyze these games.
Approachability theory has developed significantly over the years; see [38] or [30] for a survey.
Necessary and sufficient conditions for approachability of general sets have been established in
[42]. [44] considers a weaker notion called “weak approachability” and it is shown that every set is
either weakly approachable or weakly excludable. There have also been several extensions of this
framework beyond the setting of repeated games with finite action spaces, e.g., to stochastic games
[34], to repeated games with payoffs in infinite-dimensional spaces [31], to repeated games with
partial monitoring [37, 36, 39], etc.
Despite these advances in our understanding of vector repeated games, the characterization and
computation of loss vectors that can be guaranteed in expectation under the discounted loss crite-
rion and the strategies that achieve these guarantees has remained a significant gap. Discounting
of losses over time has natural interpretations in practice, e.g., it may capture a low-risk rate of
return on investment. Hence, closing this gap has significant practical ramifications. This paper
takes a major step towards bridging this gap using an ADP approach.
A well-known use of set-valued dynamic programs in the context of dynamic games is due to
Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti [3, 4]. They characterize the set of pure strategy subgame-perfect
equilibrium payoffs in non-zero sum repeated games with imperfect monitoring as the fixed point
of a set-valued DP operator. Although we have a similar fixed point characterization of the optimal
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Pareto frontier, there are important differences in the machinery involved in iterative computation
of this fixed point. Our ADP approach and related error bounds critically rely on the new metric
that we define on the space of Pareto frontiers of convex and compact sets and on the fact that
our DP operator is a contraction in this metric. On the other hand in their case, their iterative
computation scheme relies on the monotonicity of the DP operator;1 and because they don’t define
a metric space, they do not obtain error bounds. Moreover, theirs is an exact scheme akin to
‘value iteration’ in DP [9] and implementing it in practice would require defining appropriate set-
approximations that are finitely parameterized. This non-trivial issue has not been addressed in
these works. Our carefully defined polytopic set approximation scheme squarely addresses this issue
in our setting.
For the use of dynamic programming in zero-sum dynamic games one can refer to the classic
paper by Shapley [41] on stochastic games. For a general theory of dynamic programming in control
problems and Markov decision processes (MDPs), see [8, 9, 40]. We discuss relevant literature on
regret minimization and online learning in Section 5.1.
1.2. Organization of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formally introduce the model of repeated
games with vector valued losses and define the objective of characterizing the set of losses that
can be guaranteed by a player. In Section 3, we introduce the set-valued dynamic programming
approach for characterizing these guarantees and the corresponding optimal strategies. In Section 4,
we present an approximation procedure to compute approximately optimal strategies. Section 5
discusses the application of our approach to regret minimization in repeated games. Section 6
concludes the paper. The proofs of all our claims are presented in the Appendix.
2. Model.
Consider a two-player vector-valued game G defined by an action set A= {1, · · · ,m} for player 1,
who is the decision-maker and whom we will call Alice, and the action set B = {1, · · · , n} for player
2 who is the adversary and whom we will call Bob. For each pair of actions a∈A and b∈B, Alice
incurs a vector-valued loss r(a, b)∈RK .
The game G is played repeatedly in stages t= 1,2,3, · · · , T . Let GT denote this T -stage repeated
game. In each stage t, both Alice and Bob simultaneously pick their actions at and bt respectively,
and Alice bears the vector of losses r(at, bt). Fix a discount factor β ∈ [0,1). Then the vector of
total discounted losses is defined as:
T∑
t=1
βt−1r(at, bt) =
( T∑
t=1
βt−1rk(at, bt); k= 1, · · · ,K
)
. (1)
1 A set-valued operator B is monotone if A⊆A′ implies that B(A)⊆B(A′) [4]
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An adaptive randomized strategy piA for Alice specifies for each stage t, a mapping from the
set of observations till stage t, i.e., Ht = (a1, b1, · · · , at−1, bt−1), to a probability distribution on the
action set A, denoted by ∆(A). Let ΠA be the set of all such strategies of Alice. Similarly, let ΠB
be the set of all adaptive randomized strategies for Bob. For a pair of strategies piA and piB, the
expected discounted loss on component k in the repeated game is given by:
RTk (piA, piB) = EpiA,piB
[ T∑
t=1
βt−1rk(at, bt)
]
, (2)
where the expectation is over the randomness in the strategies piA and piB. Alice would like to
minimize her loss in every component k. However, reducing the loss in one dimension typically
implies increasing the loss in another dimension. For instance, consider the situation of protecting
two different targets against attacks: devoting more resources to protect one target makes the
other more vulnerable. Accordingly, it is important to characterize the set of best possible tradeoffs
between the different dimensions of the loss.
Consider a fixed strategy piA ∈ΠA. If Alice plays this strategy, then irrespective of the strategy
chosen by Bob, Alice guarantees that the long term expected vector loss is no larger than(
max
pik
B
∈ΠB
RTk (piA, pi
k
B); k= 1, · · · ,K
)
along each dimension. Let the set of all such simultaneous upper bounds that correspond to all the
strategies piA ∈ΠA be defined as:
WT ,
{(
max
pik
B
∈ΠB
RTk (piA, pi
k
B); k= 1, · · · ,K
)
: piA ∈ΠA
}
. (3)
Then characterizing the best possible tradeoffs across the different dimensions amounts to finding
the minimal points in the set W, i.e., its lower Pareto frontier, which is the set
VT ,Λ(WT ), {x∈WT : ∀x′ ∈WT \ {x}, ∃k s.t. xk <x′k}, (4)
since all other points are strictly sub-optimal. Our goal in this paper is to characterize and approxi-
mate the set V∞ that can be achieved in the infinite horizon game G∞ and compute approximately
optimal strategies for Alice in ΠA that approximately guarantee different points in it.
Our main technical contributions are as follows:
1. We show that the set V∞ is the fixed point of a set-valued dynamic programming operator
defined on the space of lower Pareto frontiers of closed convex sets with an appropriately
defined metric. We then show that the optimal strategies that guarantee different points in
this set are of the following form. V∞ can be parameterized so that each point corresponds
to a parameter value, which can be thought of as an “information state” belonging to a
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compact space. Each state is associated with an immediate optimal randomized action and a
transition rule that depends on the observed action of the adversary (but not on the Alice’s
own action). In order to attain a point in V∞, Alice starts with the corresponding state, plays
the associated randomized action, transitions into another state depending on Bob’s observed
action as dictated by the rule, plays the randomized action associated with the new state, and
so on. In particular, the strategy does not depend on Alice’s own actions and it depends on
Bob’s actions only through this state that Alice keeps track of.
2. We give a procedure to approximate V∞ and to compute an approximately optimal strategy
that only uses a coarse finite quantization of the parameter space. This strategy can be simply
implemented by a randomized finite-state automaton. Any desired diminishing approximation
error can be attained by choosing the appropriate quantization granularity and number of
iterations.
3. Set-valued dynamic programming.
We first present an informal description of our approach. Let V0 = {0}, i.e., the singleton set
containing only the zero vector in RK . We can show that one can obtain the set VT+1 from the set
VT , by decomposing Alice’s strategy in GT+1 into a strategy for the 1st stage, and a continuation
strategy for the remainder of the game from stage 2 onwards as a function of the action chosen by
both the players in the 1st stage. The inductive argument results from the fact that the minimal
guarantees that she can guarantee from stage 2 onwards are exactly the set VT . Suppose that at
the start of GT+1, Alice fixes the following plan for the entire game: she will play a mixed strategy
α ∈∆(A) in stage 1. Then depending on her realized action a and Bob’s action b, from stage 2
onwards she will play a continuation strategy that achieves the upper-bound R(a, b)∈VT (she will
choose one such point R(a, b) for every a ∈A and b ∈B). Note that it is strictly sub-optimal for
Alice to choose any points outside VT from stage 2 onwards. Now this plan for the entire game GT+1
gives Alice the following simultaneous upper bounds on the expected losses on the K dimensions:
(
max
b∈B
∑
a∈A
αa
[
rk(a, b) +βRk(a, b)
]
;k= 1, · · · ,K
)
.
By varying the choice of α and the map R(a, b) we can obtain the set of all the simultaneous upper
bounds that Alice can achieve in the (T + 1)-stage game. The lower Pareto frontier of this set is
exactly VT+1. Thus there is an operator Φ, such that
VT+1 = Φ(VT )
for any T ≥ 0. In what follows, we will show that this operator is a contraction in the space of lower
Pareto frontiers of compact and convex sets, with an appropriately defined metric. This space is
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shown to be complete, and thus the sequence VT converges in the metric to a set V∗, which is the
unique fixed point of this operator Φ. As one would guess, this V∗ is indeed the set V∞ of minimal
simultaneous upper bounds that Alice can achieve in the infinitely repeated game G∞.
The rest of this section formalizes these arguments. We will begin the formal presentation of our
results by first defining the space of Pareto frontiers that we will be working with.
3.1. A space of Pareto frontiers in [0,1]K
For the remainder of the paper, 1 and 0 denote the the vector of ones and zeros, respectively, in
RK .
Definition 1. (a) Let u,v ∈RK . We say that u v if uk ≤ vk for all k. Also, we say that u≺ v
if u v and u 6= v. For some ≥ 0 if u v+ 1, we say that v -dominates u. If = 0, we simply
say that v dominates u.
(b) A Pareto frontier in [0,1]K is a subset V of [0,1]K such that no v ∈V is dominated by another
element of V.
(c) For two Pareto Frontiers U and V, we say that V -dominates U if for every point v ∈ V,
there is a point u∈U that it -dominates. If = 0, then we simply say that V dominates U.
(d) The lower Pareto frontier (or simply Pareto frontier) of S⊂ [0,1]K , denoted by Λ(S), is the
set of elements of S that do not dominate any another element of S.
The Pareto frontier of a set may be empty, as is certainly the case when the set is open. But one
can show that the Pareto frontier of a non-empty compact set is always non-empty. The proof is
presented in the Appendix A.
Lemma 1. Suppose that S is a non-empty compact subset of RK. Then Λ(S) is non-empty.
Since compactness is equivalent to a set being closed and bounded in Euclidean spaces, any closed
subset of [0,1]K has a non-empty Pareto frontier. We next define the upset of a set, illustrated in
Figure 1.
Definition 2. Let A be a subset of B⊆RK . The upset of A in B is defined as up(A) = {x ∈B |
xk ≥ yk for all k, for some y ∈A}, i.e., up(A) is the set of all points in B that dominate some point
in A. Equivalently, up(A) = {x∈B | x= y+v, for some y ∈A and v 0}.
For a subset of [0,1]K , we will refer to its upset in [0,1]K as simply its upset. It is immediate that
the upset of a closed and convex subset of [0,1]K is closed and convex. We define the following
space of Pareto frontiers:
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Definition 3. F is the space of Pareto frontiers in [0,1]K whose upset is closed and convex.
It is easy to show that F can be equivalently defined as the space of lower Pareto frontiers of
closed and convex subsets of [0,1]K .2 We will now define a metric on this space. We first recall the
definition of Hausdorff distance induced by the L∞ norm.
Definition 4. Let A and B be two subsets of RK . The Hausdorff distance h(A,B) between the
two sets is defined as
h(A,B) = max{sup
x∈A
inf
y∈B
||x−y||∞, sup
y∈B
inf
x∈A
||x−y||∞}.
The Hausdorff distance defines a metric on the space of non-empty closed subsets of [0,1]K , and
further, this space is compact and hence complete in this metric [24]. On the other hand, it only
defines a pseudometric on space of all non-empty subsets of [0,1]K . Now, a possible straightforward
metric on the space F could be the one defined by the Hausdorff distance. But, as we discuss in
Appendix B, if K > 2, then a Pareto frontier in F may not be closed, and hence the Hausdorff
distance at best defines a pseudometric on F. Moreover, even this pseudometric is not appropriate
for our purposes as demonstrated by the following example.
Example: Consider a sequence of Pareto frontiers (Vn)n∈N where Vn is the union of the line
segment joining (0,1) and (1/n,1/n), and the segment joining (1/n,1/n) and (1,0), as depicted in
Figure 2. Then we would like this sequence of frontiers to converge to the Pareto frontier defined
by the singleton set {(0,0)}, but the Hausdorff distance between Vn and {(0,0)} doesn’t vanish
as n→∞. Under the Hausdorff metric, the sequence (Vn)n∈N converges to the union of the line
segment joining (0,1) and (0,0), and the segment joining (0,0) and (1,0), which is not in F.
It is thus clear that we need to define a different metric on F. We now proceed to define one with
the desired properties. We define the distance between two Pareto frontiers in F as the Hausdorff
distance between their upsets.3
Definition 5. For two Pareto frontiers U and V in F, we define the distance d(U,V) between
them as d(U,V), h(up(U), up(V)).
We can then show that d is a metric on F and F is compact in the metric d. The latter essentially
follows from the compactness of the space of closed subsets of [0,1]K in the Hausdorff metric. It
2 One direction is clear since a Pareto frontier in F is the lower Pareto frontier of its upset, which is closed and convex.
The other direction follows from the observation that the upset of the lower Pareto frontier of a set is the upset of
the set itself and the upset of a closed and convex set is closed and convex.
3 Since the upsets of the sets in F are compact, the sup and the inf in the definition of the Hausdorff distance can be
replaced by min and max respectively.
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up(V)
Figure 1 A Pareto frontier V and its upset
up(V) in [0,1]2.
(𝟎, 𝟏)
(𝟏, 𝟎)
(𝟏/𝒏, 𝟏/𝒏)
(𝟎, 𝟎)
Vn
Figure 2 Approximations of (1− β)V∗ for different β
values with corresponding errors
also immediately follows that F is complete. The proof of the following set of claims is presented
in Appendix A.
Proposition 1. a) d is a metric on F.
b) Let
(
Vn
)
n∈N be a sequence in F. Then there is a subsequence
(
Vnk
)
k∈N and a V ∈ F such that
d(Vnk ,V)→ 0.
In the proof, it becomes clear that d induces these properties not just on F, but also on the more
general space of Pareto frontiers in [0,1]K whose upset is closed (though not necessarily convex).
Finally, we end this section by presenting another way of defining the same metric d on F.
Definition 6. For two Pareto frontiers V and U in F, define
e(U,V), inf{≥ 0 : ∀ u∈U, ∃v ∈V s.t. v u+ 1}. (5)
In other words, e(U,V) is the smallest  ≥ 0 such that U -dominates V (note that e is not a
symmetric distance).4 We can then show the following.
Proposition 2. For any two Pareto frontiers V and U in F,
d(U,V) = max(e(U,V), e(V,U))
This means that the distance d between two frontiers V and U is less than or equal to  if both U
and V -dominate each other. This way of defining d is attractive since it does not require defining
upsets of the Pareto frontiers as we do in Definition 5. The proof of this equivalence is presented
in Appendix A.
4 The inf in the definition can be replaced by a min since e(U,V) can be equivalently defined as inf{ ≥ 0 : ∀ u ∈
up(U), ∃v ∈ up(V) s.t. v u+ 1}, and up(U) and up(V) are compact sets for any U,V∈ F.
Kamble, Loiseau, and Walrand: An ADP Approach to Repeated Games with Vector Losses
10
3.2. Dynamic programming operator and the existence of a fixed point.
By scaling and shifting the losses, we assume without loss of generality that rk(a, b)∈ [0,1−β] for
all (a, b, k). Accordingly, the total discounted rewards of the game take values in [0,1] irrespective
of the time horizon. Now, for any set S⊆ [0,1]K , define the following operator Ψ that maps S to a
subset of RK :
Ψ(S) =
{(
max
b∈B
∑
a∈A
αa
[
rk(a, b) +βRk(a, b)
]
; k= 1, · · · ,K
)
:α∈∆(A), R(a, b)∈ S ∀a∈A, b∈B
}
.
(6)
This operator can be interpreted as follows. Assuming that S is the set of vectors of simultaneous
upper bounds on expected losses that Alice can ensure in GT , Ψ(S) is the set of vectors of simul-
taneous upper bounds on expected losses that she can ensure in GT+1. If S is convex then Ψ(S) is
not necessarily convex as we demonstrate in the following example.
(𝟎, 𝟐)
(𝟐, 𝟎)
(𝟐, 𝟎)
(𝟒, 𝟐)
𝟏
𝟐
𝟏 𝟐
Figure 3 A game with vector losses.
𝒖 𝜶
(𝟐, 𝟐) (𝟒, 𝟐)
(𝟐𝜶 + 𝟒 𝟏 − 𝜶 , 𝟐 𝟏 − 𝜶 )
(𝟎, 𝟐)
(𝟐, 𝟎)
(𝟑, 𝟏)(𝟐 𝟏 − 𝜶 , 𝟐𝜶)
Figure 4 Construction of the set Ψ(S) where S =
{(0,0)}, for the game shown in Figure 3.
Example: Consider the game depicted in Figure 3. Suppose that S= {(0,0)}, which is convex.
Then for any discount factor β and any (α,1−α) where α∈ [0,1], one obtains the guarantee:
u(α) = (max(2(1−α),2α+ 4(1−α)),max(2α,2(1−α))).
This is depicted in Figure 4. Thus, by varying α, we find that the set Ψ(S) is the union of the line
segment joining points (2,2) and (3,1) and the segment joining the points (3,1) and (4,2). Clearly,
this set is not convex.
Despite the fact that the operator Ψ doesn’t preserve convexity, we can nevertheless show that
if V is a Pareto frontier in F (which means that it is the Pareto frontier of a convex and closed
set), then the Pareto frontier of Ψ(V) is also in F (observe that in the example above, the Pareto
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frontier of Ψ({(0,0)}) is the line segment joining points (2,2) and (3,1)). Further, we can also show
that if V∈ F is the set of vectors of simultaneous upper bounds on expected losses that Alice can
ensure in GT , then in any optimal plan for Alice in GT+1, the continuation strategy from stage 2
onwards need not depend on her own action in stage 1 (but it could depend on Bob’s action in the
first stage). The proof of this result is presented in Appendix A.
Lemma 2. Let V∈F. Then:
1. Λ(Ψ(V))∈F.
2. Any point u in Λ(Ψ(V)) is of the form:
u=
(
max
b∈B
[∑
a∈A
αark(a, b) +βQk(b)
]
; k= 1, · · · ,K
)
.
where Q(b)∈V for all b∈B.
We next define the following dynamic programming operator Φ on F.
Definition 7. (Dynamic programming operator) For V∈F, we define Φ(V) = Λ(Ψ(V)).
From Lemma 2, we know that Φ(V) ∈ F whenever V ∈ F. Next, we claim that Φ is a contraction
in the metric d.
Lemma 3. e(Φ(U),Φ(V))≤ βe(U,V), and hence d(Φ(U),Φ(V))≤ βd(U,V).
Finally, the completeness of F and the fact that Φ is a contraction in d directly implies the following
result as a consequence of the Banach fixed point theorem [35].
Theorem 1. For any V∈F, the sequence (An = Φn(V))n∈N converges in the metric d to the Pareto
frontier V∗ ∈ F, which is the unique fixed point of the operator Φ, i.e., the unique solution of
Φ(V) =V.
We can then show that V∗ is indeed the optimal set V∞ that we are looking for.
Theorem 2. V∞ =V∗.
3.3. Optimal strategies: existence and structure.
For a Pareto frontier V∈F, one can define a one-to-one function from some compact parameter set
P to V. Such a function parameterizes the Pareto frontier. We present one such parameterization
that will be used later in our approximation procedure. Define the set
P,∪Kk=1{(p1, · · · , pk−1,0, pk, · · · , pK−1); pr ∈ [0,1] for all r= 1, · · · ,K − 1}.
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P is thus the union of K, K − 1 dimensional faces of the hypercube [0,1]K , where each face is
obtained by pinning the value along one dimension to 0. For instance for K = 2, we have P =
[0,1]×{0}∪{0}× [0,1], i.e., the union of the line segment joining (0,0) and (0,1), and the segment
joining (0,0) and (1,0). Now consider the function F :P×F→RK , where we define,
F(p,V) = arg min
x
t (7)
s.t. x= t1+p, t∈R,
x u, u∈V.
F(p,V) is essentially the component-wise smallest point of intersection of the line x= t1+p (for
a fixed p) with the upset of V in [0,2]K . In R2, this is simply the family of lines y = x+ p′ where
p′ = p2− p1, for p′ ∈ [−1,1] (see Figure 5).
(𝟎, 𝟐)
(𝟐, 𝟎)(𝟎, 𝟎) (𝟏, 𝟎)
(𝟎, 𝟏)
F (p0,V)
y = x+ p0
V
Figure 5 Parameterization of V.
Then for a given V, the function F(.,V) : P→ up(V) defines a map such that for every point
u on V, there is a unique p ∈ P that maps only to that point. This is the p such that the line
x= t1+p intersects V at u (if the line intersects V at two or more points, then one of those points
is dominated by the other(s), which is a contradiction). Note that for some values of p, the line
x= t1+ p may not intersect V, but it will definitely intersect the upset of V in [0,2]K , which is
why in (7), we optimize over x that dominate u∈V, rather than directly optimizing over u∈V.
We can now express the DP operator in the form of such a parametrization. Assume that V∗ is
such that V∗ = Φ(V∗). Then for p∈P, one can choose α(p)∈∆(A) and q(b,p)∈P for each b∈B
such that for k ∈ {1, · · · ,K},
Fk(p,V
∗) = max
b∈B
{
∑
a∈A
αa(p)rk(a, b) +βFk(q(b,p),V
∗)}. (8)
Then we have the following result.
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Theorem 3. For any p1 ∈ P, the upper bound F(p1,V∗) ∈ V∗ on losses is guaranteed by Alice in
the infinite horizon game by first choosing action a1 ∈ A with probability αa1(p1). Then if Bob
chooses an action b1 ∈B, the optimal guarantees to choose from the second step onwards are then
βF(p2,V
∗) in βV∗, where p2 = q(b1,p1), which can be guaranteed by Alice by choosing action a2 ∈A
with probability αa2(p2), and so on.
This implies that P can be thought of as a compact state space for the strategy. Each state is
associated with an immediate optimal randomized action and a transition rule that depends on the
observed action of Bob. In order to attain a point in V∗, Alice starts with the corresponding state,
plays the associated randomized action, transitions into another state depending on Bob’s observed
action as dictated by the rule, plays the randomized action associated with the new state and so on.
In particular, the strategy does not depend on the past actions of Alice and it depends on the past
actions of Bob only through this information state that Alice keeps track of. It is interesting to note
that unlike in stochastic games or Markov decision processes (MDPs) [40], the state transitions
are not exogenously defined but they are endogenously specified by the dynamic programming
operator.
4. Approximation.
In general, except for simple examples (we will see such an example in Section 5.3.2), it is difficult
to analytically compute V∗ and the optimal strategies {(α(p), q(b,p)) : p ∈ P} that satisfy (8) by
simply using the fixed point relation. Hence, we now propose an approximate dynamic programming
procedure to approximate the optimal Pareto frontier and devise approximately optimal strategies.
In order to do so, we first define an appropriate finitely parameterized approximation of any Pareto
frontier where one gets an increasingly finer approximation as the size of the parameter space
increases.
Consider the following approximation scheme for a Pareto frontier V ∈ F. For a fixed positive
integer N , define the set
PN =∪Kk=1{(p1, · · · , pk−1,0, pk, · · · , pK−1); pr ∈ {0,
1
N
,
2
N
, · · · , N − 1
N
,1} ∀ r= 1, · · · ,K − 1}. (9)
In words, PN is obtained by approximating each of the K, K − 1 dimensional faces in P by a
uniformly distributed grid of (N + 1)K−1 points. The number of points in this set is
H(K,N),K(N + 1)K−1− (K − 1). (10)
Here K − 1 is subtracted since the 0 vector is counted an extra K − 1 number of times.
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Next, define the approximation operator to be
ΓN(V) = Λ
(
ch
({
F(p,V) : p∈PN
}))
, (11)
where F(p,V) was defined in (7). Here ch denotes the closed convex hull of a set. Thus ΓN(V)∈F
is the Lower Pareto frontier of a convex polytope, and it has at most H(K,N) vertices, where each
vertex is the point of intersection of the line x= t1+p with the upset of V for some p∈PN . The
following approximation guarantee is instrumental in driving our results.
Proposition 3. Consider a V∈F. Then
e(ΓN(V),V) = 0 and e(V,ΓN(V))≤ 1
N
,
and hence
d(V,ΓN(V))≤ 1
N
.
Next, we can express the compound operator ΓN ◦Φ via a set of explicit optimization problems
as in (7), that only take V as input:
F(p,Φ(V)) = arg min
x
t (12)
s.t. x= t1+p, t∈R,
x
∑
a∈A
αar(a, b) +βQ(b) ∀ b∈B,
α∈∆(A), Q(b)∈V ∀ b∈B.
If V ∈ F is the lower Pareto frontier of a convex polytope, then this is a linear program, and
further ΓN ◦ Φ(V) is also the lower Pareto frontier of a convex polytope. We then we have the
following result.
Proposition 4. Let G0 = {0} and let Gn = (ΓN ◦Φ)n(G0). Then
e(Gn,V
∗)≤ βn and e(V∗,Gn)≤ 1
N
(
1−βn
1−β
)
+βn. (13)
And thus
d(V∗,Gn)≤ 1
N
(
1−βn
1−β
)
+βn.
Hence for any , there is a pair (N,n) such that d(V∗,Gn) ≤ . This result implies an iterative
procedure for approximating V∗ by successively applying the compound operator ΓN ◦Φ to G0, by
solving the linear program in (12) for each p∈PN at each step. Since Gn is a lower Pareto frontier
of a convex polytope, with at most H(K,N) vertices for each n, the size of these linear programs
remain the same throughout. More details on solving these programs can be found in Appendix C.
The fact that e(Gn,V
∗) ≤ βn implies that Gn βn-dominates V∗ for all n, and thus the optimal
upper bounds in V∗ cannot be larger than in Gn + βn1. Thus as n gets larger, the set Gn + βn1
approaches V∗ “from above”, and in the limit, ends up within a 1/(N(1−β)) distance of V∗.
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4.1. Extracting an approximately optimal strategy.
From Gn, one can also extract an approximately optimal strategy pin in the infinite horizon game.
Suppose α∗(p) and Q∗(b,p) for b ∈ B are the optimal values that solve the program (12) to
compute F(p,Φ(Gn)) for different p∈PN . Then these define an approximately optimal strategy in
the following class:
Definition 8. A H(K,N)−mode stationary strategy pi is a mapping from each p∈PN to the pair
1. α(p)∈∆(A), and
2.
(
q1(b,p), · · · ,qK(b,p), z(b,p)
)
, where for all b ∈ B, qk(b,p) ∈ PN for all k = 1, · · · ,K and
z(b,p)∈∆K .
Here, ∆K is the unit simplex in RK . The interpretation is as follows. One starts with some initial
mode, i.e., a value of p ∈ PN . Then at any step, if the current mode is p, then Alice first chooses
action a∈A with probability αa(p). Then if Bob plays action b∈B, Alice samples the new mode
to be qk(b,p) with probability zk(b,p) for each k, and after having sampled a new mode, plays
accordingly thereafter.
Now, α∗(p) defines α(p) in pin, and
(
q1(b,p), · · · ,qK(b,p), z(b,p)
)
are defined such that they
satisfy
Q∗(b, p) =
K∑
k′=1
zk′(b,p)F(qk′(b,p),Gn). (14)
These
(
q1(b,p), · · · ,qK(b,p), z(b,p)
)
are directly obtained as the output of the linear program;
see Appendix C. The interpretation is as follows. If V is the lower Pareto frontier of a convex
polytope with each vertex lying on the line x= t1+p for some p∈PN , Q∗(b,p) for each b∈B that
results from solving (12) will lie on one of the faces of this Pareto frontier. Thus Q∗(b,p) can be
expressed as a convex combination of (at most K) extreme points of the face as expressed in (14).
Let Vpin be the corresponding Pareto frontier that is attained by the strategy pin (each point on
this frontier is guaranteed by choosing different possible initial randomizations over the H(K,N)
modes). Simply from the definition of V∗ as the optimal frontier, we know that Vpin dominates V∗,
i.e., e(Vpin ,V∗) = 0. But we can further show the following.
Proposition 5.
d(Vpin ,V∗)≤ 1
N
(
1−βn
1−β
)
+ 2βn +
1
N
(
2−βn−βn+1
(1−β)2
)
. (15)
Thus an approximately optimal strategy can be obtained by choosing an appropriate (N,n).
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For a fixed (N,n), in order to approximate the optimal frontier, the procedure needs to solve
nH(K,N) linear programs to give the corresponding error bound in Proposition 4. In our imple-
mentation described in Appendix C, each linear program is composed of mH(K,N)+ l+1 variables
and Km+K+1 constraints (recall that H(K,N) is polynomial in N for a fixed K). One can focus
on two terms in the approximation error separately: the first term is the quantization error which
is bounded by 1
N(1−β) and second is the iteration error which is bounded by β
n. The second term
is benign since it decays exponentially in n. The first term is dominant and requires N = 1
(1−β) to
achieve an error of . To find an -optimal strategy, we require N ≈ 1
(1−β)2 . Thus, for fixed values
of β not too close to 1, the computation isn’t prohibitive. Moreover, this computation can be done
offline once and for all. The resulting approximately optimal strategy requires a bounded memory
of O(log(H(K, 1
(1−β)2 )) bits and is simple to implement via a look-up table.
5. Application to online learning.
In many scenarios involving repeated decision-making in uncertain environments, one desires robust
performance guarantees. The well-known “online learning” paradigm captures this objective by
formulating the problem as a repeated game between the decision-maker and the environment,
where the environment is modeled as an adversary. As we discussed in the introduction, the key
notion is that of regret, which is defined as the difference between the loss incurred by the decision
maker’s choice of actions, and the loss incurred by the best fixed action that could have been chosen
in hindsight against the sequence of actions chosen by the environment. The decision maker’s goal
in this game is to design an adaptive and possibly randomized strategy, so as to minimize the
expected regret in the worst case over all the possible sequences of actions of the environment.
Since its inception by Hannan in the 1950s [23], this formulation of an online decision-making
problem under uncertainty has been widely popular both in theory and practice.
In this setting, there exist algorithms that possess the following no-regret property: if the decision-
making horizon is T , the regret scales like O(
√
T ) with high probability irrespective of the sequence
of actions chosen by the adversary; hence the time-averaged regret asymptotically vanishes almost
surely in an infinitely repeated game. In fact, Blackwell’s approachability framework can be used to
obtain such a no-regret strategy by transforming the original repeated game into a repeated game
with vector-valued losses [11]. In this new game, the number of vector components is the number
of actions available to the decision-maker, where each component keeps track of the additional
loss incurred by the strategy relative to the loss incurred if the corresponding action was always
chosen in the past. The goal of regret minimization in the original game now translates to the
goal of minimizing the maximum worst-case expected loss across all the components in this vector-
valued game. Approachability theory shows that the negative orthant is approachable in this game
Kamble, Loiseau, and Walrand: An ADP Approach to Repeated Games with Vector Losses
17
and also yields a no-regret algorithm. Stronger connections of the approachability framework with
regret minimization and other learning problems like calibration have subsequently been fruitfully
explored [1, 38, 19, 29].
Our ADP approach applies to the formulation of the regret minimization problem in infinitely
repeated games with discounting of losses over time (the discounting ensures that the total losses
remain bounded). In this setting, if the discount factor is β, appropriate adaptations of no-regret
algorithms guarantee an expected total regret of O(1/
√
1−β) as β→ 1 [15, 38]. But for a fixed
discount factor β, the performance of these algorithms can be far from optimal. Overall, except for
specific instances, algorithms that are exact or near regret optimal are not known.
In this scenario, we couple Blackwell’s transformation with our DP based approach to character-
ize the Pareto frontier of minimal regret relative to the different actions. Apart from providing new
insights into the structure of the regret optimal strategy, our ADP scheme allows us to compute
an approximately regret optimal strategies and approximations of the optimal regret.
We next formally present the regret minimization problem and its transformation into a vector
valued game, to which our approach can then be readily applied. We then apply our approximation
scheme to the problem of prediction using expert advice with binary losses. Before we do so,
we begin by discussing some of the relevant literature so as to provide some context for our
contribution.
5.1. Related literature.
The first study of regret minimization in repeated games dates back to the pioneering work of
Hannan [23], who introduced the notion of regret optimality in repeated games and proposed
the earliest known no-regret algorithm. Since then, numerous other such algorithms have been
proposed, particularly for the problem of prediction using expert advice, see [32, 45, 14, 21], one
particularly well-known class being the Multiplicative Weights update class of algorithms. Other
settings with limited feedback have been considered, most notably the multi-armed bandit setting
[5, 13]. Stronger notions of regret such as internal regret, have also been studied [20, 16, 12, 43].
Regret minimization with non-uniformly weighted losses, of which the discounted loss is a special
case, has also been considered before [15, 17, 38]. While the average regret goes to zero if the
weights satisfy a non-summability condition, lower bounds exist ([15], Thm 2.7) that show that the
optimal regret in the infinitely repeated game is bounded away from 0 if the weights are summable,
which is the case with discounting. Natural extensions of no-regret algorithms incur a cumulative
regret of O(1/
√
1−β) (and hence an average regret of O(1/√1−β)(1− β) = O(√1−β)) in this
case; for instance see Thm 2.8 in [15] and Prop. 2.22 in [38]. [17] derives better bounds for the case
where future losses are given a higher weight that current ones.
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The results on exact regret minimization are few. In an early work, Cover [18] gave the optimal
algorithm for the problem of prediction using expert advice over any finite horizon T , for the
case of 2 experts, and where the losses are {0,1}. [22] recently extended the result to the case
of 3 experts for both the finite horizon and geometrically distributed random horizon problems.
Although a geometric time horizon model seems to be related to the infinite horizon model with
discounted losses, the two problem formulations define regret differently, and thus lead to different
optimal regrets. We discuss this in Section 5.3.1. [2] considered a related problem, where a gambler
places bets from a finite budget repeatedly on a fixed menu of events, the outcomes of which are
adversarially chosen from {0,1} (you win or you lose), and characterized the minimax optimal
strategies for the gambler and the adversary. [33] considered a similar repeated decision-making
problem where an adversary is restricted to pick loss vectors (i.e., a loss for each action of the
decision-maker in a stage) from a set of basis vectors, and characterized the minimax optimal
strategy for the decision-maker under both, a fixed and an unknown horizon. Most of the approaches
in these works are specific to their settings, and exploit the assumptions on the structure of the
loss vectors. But if the loss vectors are arbitrary, these approaches are difficult to generalize and
indeed it is recognized that characterizing the optimal regret and algorithm is difficult; cf. [33].
Finally, all of the above examples deal with games with finite action spaces, which is the setting
that we are concerned with. But there are many works that consider exact minimax optimality in
repeated games with general action sets, with specific types of loss functions; see [26, 7, 27] and
references therein.
5.2. The regret minimization problem and its transformation.
Let G be a two player game with m actions A = {1, . . . ,m} for player 1, who is assumed to be
the minimizer and who we will call Alice (the decision-maker), and n actions B = {1, . . . , n} for
player 2, who is the adversary and who we will call Bob, in keeping with the previous notation.
For each pair of actions a∈A and b∈B, the corresponding loss for Alice is l(a, b)∈R. The losses
for different pairs of actions are known to Alice. The game G is played repeatedly for T stages
t = 1,2, · · · , T . In each stage, both Alice and Bob simultaneously pick their actions at ∈ A and
bt ∈ B and Alice incurs the corresponding loss l(at, bt). The loss of the repeated game is defined
to be the total discounted loss given by
∑T
t=1 β
t−1l(at, bt), where β ∈ (0,1). We define the total
discounted regret of Alice as:
T∑
t=1
βt−1l(at, bt)−min
a∈A
T∑
t=1
βt−1l(a, bt), (16)
which is the difference between her actual discounted loss, and the loss corresponding to the single
best action that could have been chosen against the sequence of actions chosen by Bob in hindsight.
Kamble, Loiseau, and Walrand: An ADP Approach to Repeated Games with Vector Losses
19
An adaptive randomized strategy piA for Alice specifies for each stage t, a mapping from the
set of observations till stage t, i.e., Ht = (a1, b1, · · · , at−1, bt−1), to a probability distribution on the
action set A, denoted by ∆(A). Let ΠA be the set of all such strategies of Alice. The adversary
Bob is assumed to choose a deterministic oblivious strategy, i.e., his choice is simply a sequence of
actions piB = (b1, b2, b3, · · · , bT ) chosen before the start of the game. Let ΠB be the set of all such
sequences.5 We would like to compute the worst case or minimax expected discounted regret which
is defined as:
min
piA∈ΠA
max
piB∈ΠB
EpiA,piB
[ T∑
t=1
βt−1l(at, bt)−min
a∈A
T∑
t=1
βt−1l(a, bt)
]
= min
piA∈ΠA
max
piB∈ΠB
EpiA,piB
[
max
a∈A
( T∑
t=1
βt−1l(at, bt)−
T∑
t=1
βt−1l(a, bt)
)]
, (17)
and the strategy for Alice that guarantees this value. Since Bob’s strategy piB is deterministic
and oblivious, the expectation in (17) is effectively only over the randomness in Alice’s strategy,
and moreover the second term does not depend on Alice’s strategy. Thus we can exchange the
expectation and the inner maximization and equivalently write (17) as:
min
piA∈ΠA
max
piB∈ΠB
max
a∈A
EpiA,piB
[ T∑
t=1
βt−1(l(at, bt)− l(a, bt))
]
. (18)
This quantity is called the pseudo-regret in regret minimization literature (see Chapter 3 in [13]).
The expected regret is equivalent to the pseudo-regret only when the adversary’s strategy is deter-
ministic and oblivious; in general if the adversary’s strategy is randomized and adaptive, then the
pseudo-regret is smaller than the expected regret.
In order to address this objective, it is convenient to define a vector-valued game G, in which,
for a pair of actions a∈A and b∈B, the vector of losses is r(a, b) with m components (recall that
|A|=m), where
rk(a, b) = l(a, b)− l(k, b) (19)
for k = 1, · · · ,m. rk(a, b) is the single-stage additional loss that Alice bears by choosing action a
instead of action k, when Bob chooses b: the so called “single-stage regret” with respect to action k.
For a choice of strategies piA ∈ΠA and piB ∈ΠB of the two players, the expected loss on component
k in this vector-valued repeated game over horizon T is given by
RTk (piA, piB) = EpiA
[ T∑
t=1
βt−1rk(at, bt)
]
, (20)
5 Having an oblivious adversary is a standard assumption in regret-minimization literature [5, 13, 15]. This makes
sense when “nature” is modeled as an adversary in an application, which would be the case for instance in weather
forecasting. Also see Chapter 3 in [13] for a discussion of different adversary models and their implications on different
definitions of regret.
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where the expectation is over the randomness in Alice’s strategy. Now observe that by playing a
fixed strategy piA ∈ΠA, irrespective of the strategy chosen by Bob, Alice guarantees that the total
expected loss on component k is no more than maxpik
B
∈ΠB R
T
k (piA, pi
k
B). Suppose that we determine
the set of all simultaneous upper bounds that correspond to all the strategies piA ∈ΠA, defined as:
WT ,
{(
max
pik
B
∈ΠB
RTk (piA, pi
k
B)
)
k=1,··· ,m
: piA ∈ΠA
}
. (21)
Then it is clear that the minimax optimal regret can be written as:
min
piA∈ΠA
max
piB∈ΠB
max
a∈A
EpiA
[ T∑
t=1
βt−1(l(at, bt)− l(a, bt))
]
= min
x∈WT
max
k
xk.
In fact, it suffices to characterize the lower Pareto frontier of the set WT , i.e., Λ(WT ), and the
strategies that achieve this frontier, since all other points are strictly sub-optimal. In particular,
we are interested in Λ(W∞).
Remark 1. It may seem curious here that instead of simply focusing on computing the minimax
optimal regret, we have expanded our objective to characterizing the entire Pareto frontier of
minimal regret relative to all actions. But this expanded objective is precisely what opens up this
problem to a DP based approach. One way to see this is to realize that in order to achieve the
minimal optimal regret, it is necessary to know the optimal strategies that focus on reducing regret
relative to certain actions more than others, since these strategies will form the optimal response
plans for the decision-maker as the profile of accumulated regret relative to the different actions
changes. We mention here that the idea of characterizing the Pareto Frontier of all achievable
regrets with respect to different actions has been explored by [25], but this was in the specific
context of prediction with expert advice with 2 experts and {0,1}−losses, and for the finite time
horizon problem.
Now we can show that the set Λ(W∞) (and Λ(WT ), in general) is exactly what we are able to
characterize and approximate using our DP approach. To see this, notice that the only difference
in assumptions is the set of strategies the adversary can use in the two formulations. Recall that
when we defined the DP operator for our vector-valued repeated game, we assumed that Bob is
allowed to choose any adaptive strategy (that could in particular depend on the actions chosen
by Alice). Thus our results are directly applicable to the problem of minimizing pseudo-regret
when the adversary is allowed to use a general strategy. But we need to argue that they are also
applicable to the problem of minimizing pseudo-regret/expected regret in the case where Bob is
restricted to using an oblivious deterministic strategy.
We do so by arguing that even if we restrict Bob to an oblivious deterministic strategy in
our original vector-valued repeated game, the set of minimal upper bounds on losses that Alice
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can guarantee is still V∗, the fixed point of our operator. First, recall that Bob’s best response
to Alice’s optimal strategy that achieves different points on the frontier V∗ is deterministic and
oblivious (offline). This is because Alice does not take into account her own actions to determine
the information state transitions (Theorem 3). In fact, if Alice is restricted to use strategies that do
not depend on her own actions chosen in the past, then the best response to such strategy is always
an offline deterministic strategy, and hence the minimal achievable frontier if Bob is restricted to
use offline deterministic strategies is V∗. So all that we need to verify is that Alice does not gain by
using strategies that depend on her own past actions, when Bob is restricted to using only offline
deterministic strategies.
To see this is indeed the case, suppose that VT is the set of minimal guarantees that Alice can
achieve by using general randomized adaptive strategies in GT , assuming that Bob is restricted to
using deterministic offline strategies. Then in GT+1, Alice’s strategy is a choice of a distribution over
her actions, α, and a mapping from the realized actions (a, b) to some continuation (randomized,
adaptive) strategy pi(a, b)∈ΠA. But since Bob’s responses that maximize the losses on the different
components cannot depend on the realization of Alice’s action a, and can only depend on α, his
best responses from time 2 onwards would effectively be against the strategy pi′(b) of Alice that
chooses the strategy pi(a, b) with probability αa for each action a. Thus Alice could as well have
chosen the continuation strategy independently of her chosen action a. And this strategy ought
to guarantee a point in VT , since all other strategies that guarantee points outside VT are strictly
sub-optimal. Thus the guarantees that Alice can achieve in GT+1 are given by the set:
VT = Λ
({(
max
b∈B
∑
a∈A
αa
[
rk(a, b) +βQk(b)
]
; k= 1, · · · ,K
)
:α∈∆(A), Q(b)∈VT+1 ∀ b∈B
})
.
But this is exactly the dynamic programming operator in Definition 7. Hence we can conclude that
V∗ is indeed the set of minimal guarantees, even if Bob is restricted to using deterministic offline
strategies.
5.3. Example: Combining expert advice.
Consider the following model of combining expert advice. There are two experts who give Alice
recommendation for a decision-making task: say predicting which route will be the quickest to go
to work the next day. Each day Alice decides to act on the recommendation made by one of the
experts. The experts’ recommendations may be correct or wrong, and if Alice acts on an incorrect
recommendation, she bears a loss of 1. Otherwise she does not incur any loss. Each day, exactly
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one expert is correct and the other is wrong.6 This model can be represented by the matrix shown
in Figure 6. The rows correspond to the choice made by Alice and the columns correspond to the
two different possibilities for the correct expect on each day. The matrix of single-stage regrets is
shown in Figure 7.
Expert	1
𝟏 𝟐𝟏 𝟎
𝟎 𝟏Expert	2
Figure 6 Possible loss scenarios
Expert	1
𝟏 𝟐(𝟎, 𝟏) (𝟎, −𝟏)
(−𝟏, 𝟎) (𝟏, 𝟎)Expert	2
Figure 7 Single-stage regret w.r.t. Expert 1 & 2.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
  = 0.5
  = 0.6
  = 0.7
  = 0.8
  = 0.9
  = 0.95 (400, 149)
(201, 66)
(101, 28)
(67, 17)
(50, 11)
(40, 8)
(N,n)
Figure 8 Approximations of the optimal frontier
(1− β)V∗(β) for different β values and
the associated (N,n). (N,n) values in
each case are chosen so that the approx-
imation error (Proposition 4) is less
than 0.06. n is chosen so that βn/(1−
β)≤ 0.01.
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.95
β
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
Figure 9 Upper bounds on the optimal expected
regret plotted as a function of the dis-
count factor β.
In Figure 8, the computed approximately optimal Pareto frontiers of regret for a range of values
of β are shown. (N,n) is chosen in each case so that the error in the approximation of (1−β)V∗(β)
is at most 0.06. Further, n is chosen in each case so that βn/(1−β)≤ 0.01, and hence Proposition 4
guarantees that 0.01 added to the approximations of optimal regret for each β result in upper
bounds on the optimal regret. These upper bounds are plotted in Figure 9.
6 It is not optimal for the adversary trying to maximize Alice’s regret to have both the experts be correct or both be
wrong. Hence these actions are omitted.
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5.3.1. Comparison with other algorithms. In this section, we compare the performance
of approximately optimal algorithms derived from our approach to two known algorithms for the
problem of prediction with expert advice. We will consider discount factors β = 0.8 and 0.9, and
K = 2 and 3 experts.7
The first algorithm we consider is the well known the exponentially weighted average forecaster,
also known as “Hedge”. In this algorithm, if Lt(i) is the cumulative loss of expert i till time t, then
the probability of choosing expert i at time t+ 1 is
pi(t+ 1)∝ exp(−ηLt(i)),
where η is a parameter. In the undiscounted problem, choosing η=
√
8 logK/T when the time hori-
zon T is known attains an upper bound of
√
T logK/2 on the expected cumulative regret (Thm.
2.2, [15]). In a certain sense, this is shown to be asymptotically optimal in K and T for general loss
function taking values in [0,1] (Thm. 3.7, [15]). In our implementation, we use discounted cumula-
tive losses in this algorithm, and choose η=
√
8 logK(1−β2). This resulting algorithm achieves an
upper bound of
√
logK/2(1−β2) =√logK/(2(1−β)(1 +β)) on the expected discounted regret
in the infinitely repeated game (see proof of Thm. 2.2, and Thm. 2.8 in [15]).
Next, we consider the optimal algorithms given by Gravin, Peres and Sivan [22] (which we
will refer to as GPS) for the experts problem with a geometrically distributed time horizon with
K = 2 and 3 experts. In this model, at each stage, the game ends with a probability 1− β and
continues with probability β. This is essentially the same as our model of discounted losses,
where the discount factor is interpreted as the probability of continuation at each stage. But the
difference between that formulation and our formulation is in the definition of regret. In their
formulation, the loss of the decision-maker is compared to the expected loss of the best expert in
the realized time horizon (where the expectation is over the randomness in the time horizon), i.e.,
to ET [mini=1,2
∑T
t=1 lt(i)], where lt(i) is the loss of expert i at time t. On the other hand, in our
formulation, the loss of the decision-maker is compared to the expert with the lowest expected
loss, i.e., to mini=1,2 ET [
∑T
t=1 lt(i)] = mini=1,2
∑∞
t=1 β
t−1lt(i). Naturally, the optimal regret in their
formulation is at least as high as the optimal regret in our formulation, and in fact it turns out
to be strictly higher. For example, for K = 2 and β = 0.9, the optimal regret in their formulation
is ≈ 1.147,8 while in our formulation, the optimal regret in this case is at most ≈ 0.9338 (see
Figure 9). Further, it is clear that their optimal strategy gives the same guarantee for our definition
7 The code for all our numerical experiments can be found at https://github.com/vijaykamble/
vector-repeated-games.
8 The optimal regret for [22]’s formulation is 1
2
√
1−β2
. The expression in [22] is off by a factor of β since they discount
the first period by β (i.e., the game could end before the first stage begins), whereas we discount it by 1.
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of regret as the optimal regret in their definition, i.e., for instance, for β = 0.9, their strategy
will guarantee an expected regret of at most ≈ 1.147 according to our definition. Note that in
the context where discounting captures the temporal change in the present value of money, our
formulation of regret is the natural one. The GPS algorithms for K = 2 and 3 are described in
Appendix D.
Results for K=2. We first consider K = 2 experts. We compare the performance of our approx-
imately optimal strategy with the performance of GPS and Hedge against 3 different adversaries
defined below. Note that the policy of the maxmin optimal adversary in our model is unknown.
1. Adversary A: This adversary gives a loss of 1 to one expert (and 0 to the other) uniformly at
random. In the geometrically distributed time horizon model with regret as defined in [22],
this has been shown to be the maxmin optimal adversary.
2. Adversary B: This adversary chooses a Bernoulli(1/2 − √1−β) loss for expert 1 and a
Bernoulli(1/2) loss for expert 2.9 10
3. Adversary C: In this adversary’s strategy, the probability that expert 1 incurs a loss (and
expert 2 doesn’t) at time t is 0.91/t if t is odd, and 0.9t if t is even.
Figures 11 and 10 compare the expected regret incurred by Hedge and GPS to the expected regret
incurred by our approximately optimal strategies for β = 0.8 and 0.9. For β = 0.8 we computed
a 203−mode (H(2,101)) strategy and a 21−mode (H(2,10)) strategy (n= 28 in both cases). For
β = 0.9 we computed a 403−mode (H(2,201)) strategy and a 41−mode (H(2,20)) strategy (n= 66
in both cases). The expected regret is estimated in each case by averaging over 10000 runs, where
each run is a game with time horizon T = 100. The associated error bars (±1.96× standard error)
are shown in the graph.
In both cases, our strategies significantly outperform Hedge and GPS against Adversaries B and
C, while they result in comparable performance against Adversary A. Observe that against all
the three adversaries, the regret incurred by both our strategies does not significantly exceed the
upper bounds of ≈ 0.6886 for β = 0.8 and ≈ 0.9338 for β = 0.9. The regret of GPS significantly
exceeds these values in both cases by a considerable margin against Adversary C. This in particular
eliminates the possibility of GPS being exactly optimal for our problem with high probability. As
expected, the average regret incurred by the GPS algorithm does not significantly exceed the values
of ≈ 0.8333 and ≈ 1.147 respectively, which are the optimal values of regret as defined by GPS.
9 Adversary B could give a loss of 1 or a loss of 0 to both experts in some stage. In this case, our algorithm stays in
the same mode at the end of the stage.
10 The difference in the discounted average losses between the two experts in this case is
√
1−β, which is known to
be the order of the optimal regret.
Kamble, Loiseau, and Walrand: An ADP Approach to Repeated Games with Vector Losses
25
GPS Hedge 203-mode 21-mode
0.67
0.68
0.69
0.70
Adversary A
GPS Hedge 203-mode 21-mode
0.52
0.54
0.56
0.58
0.60
0.62
Adversary B
GPS Hedge 203-mode 21-mode
0.70
0.75
0.80
Adversary C
Figure 10 Estimates of the expected regret of different algorithms for K = 2 and β = 0.8 against
the different adversaries, along with associated error bars (±1.96× standard error). Upper
bound on optimal regret is ≈ 0.6886.
GPS Hedge 403-mode 41-mode
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Adversary A
GPS Hedge 403-mode 41-mode
0.70
0.75
0.80
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1.05
1.10
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Figure 11 Estimates of the expected regret of different algorithms for K = 2 and β = 0.9 against
the different adversaries, along with associated error bars (±1.96× standard error). Upper
bound on optimal regret is ≈ 0.9338.
Similarly, considering the performance against Adversary C, Hedge appears to be sub-optimal
by a large margin for β = 0.8. But its performance comes close to the upper bound of ≈ 0.9338
for β = 0.9. This seems aligned with the possibility of Hedge being asymptotically optimal for our
problem as β→ 1.
Finally, it is also interesting to note that there is no significant difference in the performance
of the 203−mode and 21−mode strategies for β = 0.8, or in the performance of the 403−mode
and 41−mode strategies for β = 0.9. This suggests the possibility of obtaining better performance
bounds for less complex strategies, potentially using some other approximation schemes.
Results for K=3. The possible losses for the experts problem with 3 experts is shown in
Figure 12.11 The resulting matrix of single stage regret vectors are shown in Figure 13.
For β = 0.8 and 0.9, we approximated the frontiers using (N,n) = (20,20), resulting in a
H(3,20) = 1321−mode strategy in each case. The approximate value of optimal regret was ≈ 0.9067
and ≈ 1.244 respectively. The values of βn/(1 − β) in the two cases (n = 20) are ≈ 0.057 and
11 The optimal adversary isn’t expected to give a loss of 0 or a loss of 1 to all experts, and hence these two actions
are omitted.
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Figure 12 Possible loss scenarios with 3 experts.
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Figure 13 Single-stage regret w.r.t. Experts 1, 2
and 3.
≈ 1.215, resulting in upper bounds of ≈ 0.9637 and ≈ 2.459 respectively. The theoretical error is
quite high in this case and hence both these upper bounds and the strategies are expected to be
crude approximations. We compared the performance of these strategies with the performance of
GPS and Hedge against the following three adversaries. Again, note that the policy of the maxmin
optimal adversary in our model is unknown.
1. Adversary D: This adversary chooses one of the six possible actions uniformly at random
at each stage.
2. Adversary E: This is an optimal adversary in the GPS model for 3 experts.12 For i≤ j, let
dij be the difference in the cumulative losses of the expert with the i
th lowest loss and the
expert with the jth lowest loss. Then if d12 = d13 = 0, then with equal probability of 1/3, the
algorithm gives a loss of 0 to one expert and a loss of 1 to each of the remaining two experts.
Otherwise, with probability (1/2), the algorithm gives no loss to the leading expert and a loss
of 1 to each of the others, and with probability (1/2) it gives a loss of 1 only to the leading
expert, and no loss to others.
3. Adversary F: This adversary gives a loss of Bernoulli(1/2−√1−β) to expert 1 and a loss
of Bernoulli(1/2) to each of the two remaining experts at each stage.13
The results (again, over 10000 runs with horizon T = 100) are shown in Figures 14 and 15 for
β = 0.8 and 0.9 respectively.
Observe that the 1321−mode strategies, despite being crude approximations, significantly out-
perform both GPS and Hedge against Adversary F, and their performance is comparable to these
algorithms in the remaining cases. This again suggests the possibility of obtaining tighter error
bounds for less complex strategies through other approximation techniques (although this is far
from being a comprehensive test). Unlike for the case of K = 2, we were not able to design an
adversary in this case that would rule out the optimality of GPS or Hedge with high probability.
12 The optimal adversary in this case is not unique; we arbitrarily choose one of the many mentioned in [22].
13 If Adversary C gives a loss of 1 or a loss of 0 to all the experts in some stage, our strategy doesn’t change its mode
at the end of that stage.
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Figure 14 Estimates of the expected regret of different algorithms for K = 3 and β = 0.8 against
the different adversaries, along with associated error bars (±1.96× standard error). Upper
bound on optimal regret is ≈ 0.9637.
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1.12
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Adversary F
Figure 15 Estimates of the expected regret of different algorithms for K = 3 and β = 0.9 against
the different adversaries, along with associated error bars (±1.96× standard error). Upper
bound on optimal regret is ≈ 2.459.
Note that for K = 3, the optimal regret in the GPS model is ≈ 1.1111 for β = 0.8 and ≈ 1.5294 for
β = 0.9.14
5.3.2. Exact characterization of V∗ for K = 2 and β = 0.5. In some simple examples,
we can exactly determine the set V∗ by “solving” the fixed point relation given by the dynamic
programming operator. We demonstrate this by determining the optimal Pareto frontier in the
game of combining expert advice (Figure 7) from 2 experts for β = 0.5. Note that the points
(0,1/(1− β)) = (0,2) and (1/(1− β),0) = (2,0) lie on V∗ (achieved by choosing Expert 1 always
or Expert 2 always, respectively). We can thus represent V∗ by a convex and decreasing function
f(x) defined on x ∈ [0,2] such that f(0) = 2 and f(2) = 0, so that V∗ = {(x, f(x)) : x ∈ [0,2]}. βV∗
for β = 0.5 is thus the set {(βx,βf(x)) : x∈ [0,2]}= {(x,0.5f(x/0.5) : x∈ [0,1]}, which thus can be
represented by the convex, decreasing function f¯(x) = f(2x)/2 defined on x∈ [0,1], where f¯(0) = 1
and f¯(1) = 0.
14 The optimal regret in the GPS model for K = 3 experts is 2
3
√
1−β2
.
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Figure 16 Construction of up(U(x)).
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Figure 17 Construction of up(U(0.5)).
Now for a fixed randomization over Alice’s actions, (1−x,x), by choosing different points in V∗
from the next stage onwards, one obtains the set of guarantees
U(x) =
{(
max(−x+ 0.5Q1(1), x+ 0.5Q1(2)),
max(1−x+ 0.5Q2(1), x− 1 + 0.5Q2(2))
)
:Q(1), Q(2)∈V∗
}
. (22)
If we denote the set (−x,1− x) + 0.5V∗ (which is obtained by mapping each element u of V∗ to
(−x,1−x) + 0.5u)), by U1(x), and the set (x,x− 1) + 0.5V∗ by U2(x), it is straightforward to see
that
up(U(x)) = up(U1(x))∩up(U2(x)),
where up(.) is the upset of the set in [0,2]2. This is depicted in Figure 16. The fixed point relation
says that
V∗ = Λ
(
∪x∈[0,1] up(U(x))
)
.
From the figure, one can see that V∗ is the curve traced by the lower left corner point of up(U(x))
as x varies between 0 and 1. Since we already know that the two extreme points on V∗ are (0,2)
and (2,0), for x = 0.5, we know that the lower left corner point of up(U(0.5)) is (0.5,0.5), and
hence is contained in V∗, as shown in Figure 17. Since we know that V∗ is symmetric around the
line x = y, we know that f(x) = f−1(x), and thus it is sufficient to determine f(x) in the range
x∈ [0,0.5]. In this range, f satisfies the following fixed point relation (again, see Figure 16):
f(x) = f¯(2x) + 1−x
= f(4x)/2 + 1−x. (23)
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Taking the derivative twice on both sides, we obtain:
f ′′(x) = 8f ′′(4x).
This gives us f ′′(x) = ax−
3
2 for any a ∈ R. Integrating, we obtain f(x) = a√x+ x+ 2. Since we
want f(0.5) = 0.5, we obtain a=−2√2. Thus we have f(x) =−2√2x+ x+ 2. Note that f(2) = 0,
and it turns out that f(x) restricted to the domain x∈ [0,2] is such that f(x) = f−1(x). Thus f(x)
is the function we are looking for and V∗ = {(x,−2√2x+x+ 2) : x∈ [0,2]}.
We can compare this exact characterization with the approximate frontier that we computed
using our approximation procedure for β = 0.5 (approximation error less than 0.06). Both these
frontiers are plotted in Figure 18. As we can observe, the two frontiers are close to identical.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0 Exact 0.5V∗(0.5)
Approx. 0.5V∗(0.5)
Figure 18 Comparison of the approximation of 0.5V∗(0.5) and the exact characterization 0.5V∗(0.5) =
{(x,−2√x+x+ 1) : x∈ [0,1]}.
Optimal Policy: To attain the point (x, f(x)) for x ∈ [0,0.5], the optimal strategy of Alice
chooses a randomization (1 − x,x); then if the adversary chooses action 1, the next point she
chooses to attain is (4x, f(4x)), whereas if he chooses action 2 then the next point she chooses to
attain is (0, f(0)). To attain the point (f(x), x) for x∈ [0,0.5], the optimal strategy of Alice chooses
a randomization (x,1− x); then if the adversary chooses action 2, the next point she chooses to
attain is (f(4x),4x), whereas if he chooses action 1, then the next point she chooses to attain is
(f(0),0).
6. Conclusion and future directions.
We presented a novel approximate dynamic programming approach to approximate the set of
minimal guarantees that a player can achieve in a discounted repeated game with vector losses. We
showed that this optimal set is the fixed point of a contractive dynamic programming operator,
and it is the Pareto frontier of some convex and closed set. We also established the structure of the
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optimal strategies that achieve the different points on this set. Finally, we proposed an iterative
procedure to approximately compute this set and also find approximately optimal strategies. We
showed that this approach gives us a way to compute approximately regret-minimizing strategies
for playing repeated games with discounted losses.
The extension of this approach to the case of long-run average losses in infinitely repeated
games is less straightforward, despite the fact that average cost dynamic programming for standard
dynamic optimization problems like MDPs is quite well understood. Such an extension would
fill a significant portion of the remaining gap in viewing the approximate dynamic programming
paradigm as a methodical approach to designing robust decision-making algorithms.
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Appendix
A. Proof of all results.
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider the minimization problem:
min
x∈S
f(x) =
K∑
k=1
xk.
Since f(x) is a continuous function defined on a compact set, it achieves this minimum value at
some point x∗ ∈ S. Hence there cannot be any point x′ ∈ S such that x′ ≺ x∗, which means that x∗
is on the Pareto frontier of S. 
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Proof of Proposition 1. In order to prove the result, we need the following set of results about
the Hausdorff distance:
Lemma 4. a) h is a metric on the space of closed subsets of RK.
b) Assume that (An)n∈N is a sequence of closed subsets of [0,1]K. Then there is a subsequence
(Ank)k∈N that converges to some closet subset A of [0,1]
K.
c) If the sets (An)n∈N in b) are convex, then A is convex.
d) h(up(A), up(B))≤ h(A,B).
Proof. a)-b) This is the well-known property of the Hausdorff distance, and the compactness
property of the space of closed subsets of a compact set under the Hausdorff metric; see [24, 35].
d) Say that x,y ∈A. Then x= limn xn and y= limn yn for xn ∈An and yn ∈An. By convexity
of each An, zn := λxn + (1− λ)yn ∈An. But then, zn→ z := λx+ (1− λ)y. It follows that z ∈A,
so that A is convex.
e) Let  := h(A,B). Pick x ∈ up(A). Then x= y+ v for some y ∈A and v  0. There is some
y′ ∈B with ‖y−y′‖∞ ≤ . Then x′ = min{y′+v,1} ∈ up(B), where 1 is the vector of ones in RK ,
i.e., (1;k = 1, · · · ,K), and the minimization is component-wise. We claim that ‖x′ − x‖∞ ≤ . If
y′+v ∈ [0,1]K , this is clear. Assume y′k + vk > 1. Then,
x′k = 1< y
′
k + vk and xk = yk + vk ≤ 1.
Thus,
0≤ x′k−xk < y′k + vk− yk− vk = y′k− yk.
Hence, |x′k−xk| ≤ |y′k− yk| for any k. Thus, one has ‖x′−x‖∞ ≤ ‖y′−y‖∞ ≤ .

Now we can prove the proposition. First, to show that d is a metric on F, we just need to show
that if h(up(V), up(U)) = 0 then V=U. The other properties (e.g., triangle inequality etc.) follow
from the corresponding properties for the Hausdorff metric. Note that if h(up(V), up(U)) = 0, then
up(V) = up(U). Suppose that there is some u ∈ U such that u /∈ V. But since u ∈ up(V), we have
u= v+y for some v ∈ V and some y 0. But since h(up(V), up(U)) = 0, by the definition of the
Hausdorff distance, for each  > 0, there is a point u in up(U) such that u  v+ 1. Consider a
sequence (n)n∈N such that n→ 0, and consider the corresponding sequence (un)n∈N. Now since
up(U) is compact, (un)n∈N has a convergent subsequence that converges to some u
∗ ∈ up(U) such
that u∗  v v+y= u, which contradicts the fact that u∈U. Thus U=V.
Next, we prove statement (b). From statement (b) and (c) of Lemma 4, the subsequence
(up(Vnk))k∈N converges to some convex set A. But since h(up(Vnk), up(A)) ≤ h(up(Vnk),A), we
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have up(A) =A. And thus the subsequence (Vnk)k∈N converges to the Pareto frontier of A, which
is in F.
Observe that it becomes clear from the above arguments that d induces these properties not just
on F, but also on the more general space of Pareto frontiers in [0,1]K whose upset is closed. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose that max(e(U,V), e(V,U)) ≤ . Consider a point x ∈ up(U)
such that x = y + v where y ∈ U and v  0. Suppose that there is no x′ ∈ up(V) such that
‖x−x′‖∞ ≤ , i.e., for any x′ ∈ up(V), ‖x−x′‖∞ > . This means that up(V) is a subset of the region
{x′ : x′k >xk +  for some k} (this is the region S shown in the Figure 19). But since y= x−v, we
have y x (y is in region S′ shown in the Figure 19). But then for any w ∈ S′, ‖y−w‖∞ > . This
contradicts the fact that for y there is some y′ ∈ V, such that y+ 1 y′. Thus d(U,V)≤ . Now
𝝐𝒙
𝒚
S
S 0
up(B)
B
A
S
0 1
1
Figure 19 Construction in [0,1]2 for the proof of Proposition 2.
suppose that d(U,V)≤ . Then for any x∈U, there is a x′ ∈ up(V) such that ‖x−x′‖∞ ≤  where
x′ = y+ v for y ∈ V and v  0. Thus x+ 1 x′ = y+ v. The roles of U and V can be reversed.
Thus max(e(U,V), e(V,U))≤ . Observe that this proof uses the fact that the sup and inf in the
definitions of h and e can be replaced by max and min respectively, which is valid for the space F
as discussed in footnotes 3 and 4. 
Proof of Lemma 2: In order to prove this lemma, we need a few intermediate results. We define
the following notion of convexity of Pareto frontiers.
Definition 9. A Pareto frontier V is p-convex if for any v, u ∈ V and for each λ ∈ [0,1], there
exists a point r∈V such that r λv+ (1−λ)u.
We then show the following equivalence.
Lemma 5. For a Pareto frontier V⊂ [0,1]K, the following statements are equivalent:
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1. V is in F.
2. V⊆ [0,1]K is p-convex and up(V) is closed.
Proof. To show that 1 implies 2, we just need to show that V is p-convex. To see this, suppose
that u and v are two points in V. Since they also belong to up(V), which is convex, for each
λ∈ [0,1], λu+ (1−λ)v ∈ up(V) and thus there is some r∈V such that r λu+ (1−λ)v. Thus V
is p-convex.
To show that 2 implies 1, we just need to show that up(V) is convex if V is p-convex. To see this,
suppose that u+x and v+y are two points in (V) where u, v ∈V and x, y 0. By p-convexity of V,
for each λ∈ [0,1], there is a r∈V such that r λu+(1−λ)v and thus r λ(u+x)+(1−λ)(v+y).
Thus up(V) is convex.

We can now prove Lemma 2. Recall that,
Ψ(V) =
{(
max
b∈B
{∑
a∈A
αa
[
rk(a, b) +βRk(a, b)
]}
;k= 1, · · · ,K
)
:α∈∆(A), R(a, b)∈V∀a∈A, b∈B
}
.
First, note that Λ(Ψ(V)) = Λ(Ψ(up(V))). Now one can see that Ψ(up(V)) is the image of a con-
tinuous function from the product space up(V)m×n×∆(A) to a point in RK , which is a Hausdorff
space. Since up(V) is closed and bounded, it is compact. Also the simplex ∆(A) is compact. Thus
the product space up(V)m×n ×∆(A) is compact. Hence by the closed map lemma, f is a closed
map and hence Ψ(up(V)) is closed. Hence up(Λ(Ψ(V))) is closed.
Next, recall that any point u in Λ(Ψ(V)) is of the form:
u=
(
max
b∈B
{∑
a∈A
αa
[
rk(a, b) +βRk(a, b)
]}
;k= 1, · · · ,K
)
for some α ∈∆(A) and R(a, b) ∈ V. But since V is p-convex from Lemma 5, for each b ∈B, there
exists some Q(b)∈V such that Q(b)∑ma=1αaR(a, b). Hence statement 2 follows.
Now let
u=
(
max
b∈B
{∑
a∈A
αark(a, b) +βQk(b)
}
;k= 1, · · · ,K
)
and
v=
(
max
b∈B
{∑
a∈A
ηark(a, b) +βRk(b)
}
;k= 1, · · · ,K
)
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be two points in Λ(Ψ(V)), where α, η ∈∆(A) and Q(b), R(b)∈V for all b∈B. For a fixed λ∈ [0,1],
let z=αλ+η(1−λ). Then
λu+ (1−λ)v
=
(
λmax
b∈B
{∑
a∈A
αark(a, b) +βQk(b)
}
+ (1−λ)max
b∈B
{∑
a∈A
ηark(a, b) +βRk(b)
}
;k= 1, · · · ,K
)

(
max
b∈B
{∑
a∈A
zark(a, b) +β[λQk(b) + (1−λ)Rk(b)]
}
;k= 1, · · · ,K
)

(
max
b∈B
{∑
a∈A
zark(a, b) +βLk(b)
}
;k= 1, · · · ,K
)
.
The first inequality holds since max is a convex function and the second follows since V is p-convex,
and hence L(b)∈V that satisfy the given relation exist. Thus Λ(Ψ(V)) is p-convex. Combined with
the fact that up(Λ(Ψ(V))) is closed, this implies that Λ(Ψ(V))∈F using Lemma 5. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose e(U,V) = . Let(
max
b∈B
{∑
a∈A
αark(a, b) +βRk(b)
}
;k= 1, · · · ,K
)
be some point in Φ(V), where α ∈ ∆(A). Then for each b, we can choose Q(b) ∈ U such that
Q(b)R(b) + 1. We then have
max
b∈B
{∑
a∈A
αark(a, b) +βQk(b)
}
= max
b∈B
{∑
a∈A
αark(a, b) +βRk(b) +β(Qk(b)−Rk(b))
}
≤ max
b∈B
{∑
a∈A
αark(a, b) +βRk(b) +β
}
= max
b∈B
{∑
a∈A
αark(a, b) +βRk(b)
}
+β.
Thus (
max
b∈B
{∑
a∈A
αark(a, b) +βQk(b)
}
;k= 1, · · · ,K
)

(
max
b∈B
{∑
a∈A
αark(a, b) +βRk(b)
}
;k= 1, · · · ,K
)
+β1.
But since (
max
b∈B
{∑
a∈A
αark(a, b) +βQk(b)
}
;k= 1, · · · ,K
)
∈Ψ(U),
and since Φ(U) = Λ(Ψ(U)), there exists some L∈Φ(U) such that
L
(
max
b∈B
{∑
a∈A
αark(a, b) +βQk(b)
}
;k= 1, · · · ,K
)
.
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Thus
L
(
max
b∈B
{∑
a∈A
αark(a, b) +βRk(b)
}
;k= 1, · · · ,K
)
+β1.
Thus
e(Φ(U),Φ(V))≤ β= βe(U,V). (24)

Proof of Theorem 2. In G∞, fix T ≥ 1 and consider a truncated game where Alice can guarantee
the cumulative losses in βT+1V∗ after time T + 1. Then the minimal losses that she can guarantee
after time T is the set:
Λ
({(
max
b∈B
βT
∑
a∈A
αark(a, b) +β
T+1Qk(b);k= 1, · · · ,K
) |α∈∆(A), Q(b)∈V∗ ∀ b∈B}).
This set is βTV∗. By induction, this implies that the set of minimal losses that she can guarantee
after time 0 is V∗.
The losses of the truncated game and of the original game differ only after time T + 1. Since the
losses at each step are bounded by (1−β), the cumulative losses after time T + 1 are bounded by
βT+1(1−β)
1−β = β
T+1. Consequently, the minimal losses of the original game must be in the set{
u∈ [0,1]K : uk ∈ [xk−βT+1, xk +βT+1] for all k, x∈V∗
}
.
Since T ≥ 1 is arbitrary, the minimal losses that Alice can guarantee in the original game must be
in V∗. 
Proof of Theorem 3. Assume that Alice can guarantee every pair βT+1u of cumulative losses
with u∈V∗ after time T + 1 by choosing some continuation strategy in ΠA. Let x=F(p,V∗). We
claim that after time T , Alice can guarantee a loss of no more than βTx on each component by
first choosing aT = a with probability αa(p) and then if Bob chooses b∈B, choosing a continuation
strategy that guarantees her F(p′,V∗), where p′ = q(b,p). Indeed by following this strategy, her
expected loss on component k after time T is then
{βT
∑
a
αa(p)rk(a, b) +β
T+1Fk(q(b,p),V
∗)} ≤ βTFk(p,V∗) = βTxk.
Thus, this strategy for Alice guarantees that her loss after time T is no more than βTV∗. Hence by
induction, following the indicated strategy (in the statement of the theorem) for the first T steps
and then using the continuation strategy from time T + 1 onwards, guarantees that her loss is not
more than F(p1,V
∗) after time 0. Now, even if Alice plays arbitrarily after time T +1 after following
the indicated strategy for the first T steps, she still guarantees that her loss is (componentwise)
no more than F(p1,V
∗) + βT+1(1;k = 1, · · · ,K)T . Since this is true for arbitrarily large values of
T , playing the given strategy indefinitely guarantees that her loss is no more than F(p1,V
∗). 
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Proof of Proposition 3. Any point e in ΓN(V) is of the form
∑M
k=1 λkvk where vk ∈ up(V) and∑M
k=1 λk = 1, and M ≤K. But then by the definition of an upset, we have v′k ∈ V for each k such
that v′k  vk and hence
∑M
k=1 λkv
′
k 
∑M
k=1 λkvk. By the p-convexity of V, there is some r∈V, such
that r∑Mk=1 λkv′k, and hence r e. Thus e(ΓN(V),V) = 0.
Next, we will show that for any u ∈ V, there exists e ∈ ΓN(V) such that e  u+ (1/N)1. For
the rest of the proof, all the distances refer to distances in the L∞ norm. Consider a line x =
t1 + p, and suppose that the shortest distance between u and any point on this line is a > 0,
i.e., min
{||u− x||∞ : x = t1 + p} = a. Let x∗ = t∗1 + p be the point on the line that is closest
to u. If a+ , max{(x∗k − uk)+ : k = 1, · · · ,K} and a− , max{−(x∗k − uk)− : k = 1, · · · ,K}, then
a= max{a+, a−}. Consider any point v that is the smallest point of intersection of x= t1+p and
the set up(V). Then this point must lie in the set {t1 + p : t ∈ [t∗ − a+, t∗ + a−]}, because a) if
v = t′1+ p for some t′ < t∗ − a+, then it means that u dominates v which contradicts the fact
that v ∈ up(V), and b) if v= t′1+p for some t′ > t∗+ a− then v will strictly dominate u on each
dimension, but then the point v′ = (t∗+ a−)1+p is strictly smaller than v and lies in up(V) and
on the line v= t′1+p, which contradicts the definition of v. Thus ||u−v||∞ ≤ a+ +a− ≤ 2a. Thus
we have shown that if the shortest distance between u and some line x = t1+ p is a, then the
distance between u and the smallest point of intersection of x = t1+ p and the set up(V) is no
more than 2a.
Now we will show that the for any u ∈ V, there is always a line x = t1 + p such that the
shortest distance between u and the line is no more than 1/(2N). Let umin = mink{uk}. Then
u= umin1+ (u− umin1). Now the vector (u− umin1) has value 0 on one dimension, and on every
other dimension it has value in [0,1] (since u ∈ [0,1]K), and so it can be approximated by some
pk ∈ {0,1/N, · · · , (N−1)/N,1} where the approximation error on any dimension is at most 1/(2N).
Thus there is a point e′ = umin1+ p where p ∈ PN such that ‖u− e′‖ ≤ 1/(2N). Thus there us
always a line x= t1+ p such that the shortest distance between u and the line is no more than
1/2N .
Together, we finally have that for any u ∈V there is some point e′′, which is the smallest point
of intersection of some line x= t1+p and the set up(V), such that ‖u−e′′‖∞ ≤ 2× (1/2N) = 1/N ,
and thus e′′  u+ (1/N)1. Since there is always some point e ∈ ΓN(V) such that e  e′′ (recall
the definition (11) of ΓN(V) as the Pareto frontier of the set ch
({
F(p,V) : p ∈ PN
})
), we have
e u+ (1/N)1. Thus e(V,ΓN(V))≤ 1/N . 
Proof of Proposition 4. We have Gn = ΓN ◦Φ(Gn−1)). Consider another sequence of Pareto fron-
tiers (
An = Φ
n(G0)
)
n∈N
. (25)
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Then we have
d(An,Gn) = d(Φ(An−1),ΓN(Φ(Gn−1)))
(a)
≤ d(Φ(An−1),Φ(Gn−1)) + d(Φ(Gn−1),ΓN(Φ(Gn−1)))
(b)
≤ βd(An−1,Gn−1) + 1
N
, (26)
where inequality (a) is the triangle inequality and (b) follows from (24) and Lemma 3. Coupled
with the fact that d(A0,G0) = 0, we have that
d(An,Gn) ≤ 1
N
(
1 +β+β2 + · · ·βn−1
)
=
1
N
(
1−βn
1−β
)
. (27)
Since Φ is a contraction, the sequence {An} converges to some Pareto frontier V∗. Suppose that
we stop the generation of the sequences {An} and {Gn} at some n. Now since A0 = G0 = {0}, and
since the stage losses rk(a, b) ∈ [0,1− β], we have that d(A1,A0) ≤ 1− β. From the contraction
property, this implies that d(An+1,An) ≤ βn(1− β). Thus d(V∗,An) ≤ β
n(1−β)
1−β = β
n, and thus by
triangle inequality we have
d(V∗,Gn)≤ 1
N
(
1−βn
1−β
)
+βn. (28)
Finally, to show that e(Gn,V
∗)≤ βn, observe that
e(Gn,An) = e(ΓN(Φ(Gn−1)),Φ(An−1))
(a)
≤ e(ΓN(Φ(Gn−1)),Φ(Gn−1)) + e(Φ(Gn−1),Φ(An−1))
(b)
≤ 0 +βe(Gn−1,An−1). (29)
Since A0 = G0 = {0}, this implies that e(Gn,An) = 0 for all n. Here, (a) holds since if for three
frontiers U, V and L, U 1-dominates V and V 2-dominates Z, then U (1 + 2)-dominates Z. (b)
follows from the contraction property of Φ under e. Further, e(An,V
∗)≤ d(An,V∗)≤ βn from above.
Thus we have e(Gn,V
∗)≤ e(Gn,An) + e(An,V∗)≤ βn.

Proof of Proposition 5. In order to prove this result, we need a few intermediate definitions
and results. First, we need to characterize the losses guaranteed by any H(K,N)−mode stationary
strategy. Such a strategy pi defines the following operator on any function F : PN → RK (PN is
defined in (9)):
∆piN(F)(p) =
(
max
b∈B
{∑
a∈A
αa(p)rk(a, b) +
K∑
k′=1
zk′(b,p)βFk(qk′(b,p))
}
;k= 1, · · · ,K
)
, (30)
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where qk′(b,p)∈PN for all k′. Now for a function F :PN →RK , define the following norm:
‖F‖= max
p∈PN
‖F(p)‖∞.
It is easy to show that ∆piN is a contraction in the norm. We omit the proof for the sake of brevity.
Lemma 6.
‖∆piN(F)−∆piN(G)‖ ≤ β‖F−G‖. (31)
We can then show the following result.
Lemma 7. Consider a H(K,N)-mode strategy pi. Then there is a unique function
Fpi :PN →RK
such that ∆piN(F
pi) =Fpi. Further, The strategy pi initiated at mode p where p∈PN guarantees the
vector of losses Fpi(p).
The first part of the result follows from the fact that the operator is a contraction and the com-
pleteness of the space of vector-valued functions with a finite domain for the given norm. The
second part follows from arguments similar to those in the proof of Theorem 3. The arguments are
not repeated here for the sake of brevity. Now let
Vpin ,Λ
(
ch({Fpin(p) : p∈PN)
)
,
where Fpin is the fixed point of the operator ∆pinN .
Define a sequence of functions Fn :PN →RK where Fn(p) =F(p,Φ(Gn−1)) =F(p,Gn). We then
have that
d(Vpin ,V∗) ≤ d(Vpin ,Gn) + d(Gn,V∗) (32)
≤ d(Vpin ,Gn) + 1
N
(
1−βn
1−β
)
+βn. (33)
From the definition of d, it is clear that d(Vpin ,Gn)≤ ‖Fpin −Fn‖. Next we have
‖Fpin −Fn‖ ≤ ‖Fpin −∆pinN (Fn)‖+ ‖∆pinN (Fn)−Fn‖ (34)
(a)
= ‖∆pinN (Fpin)−∆pinN (Fn)‖+ ‖Fn+1−Fn‖ (35)
(b)
≤ β‖Fpin −Fn‖+ ‖Fn+1−Fn‖. (36)
(37)
Here (a) holds because ∆pinN (F
n) =Fn+1 by the definition of the strategy pin, and because F
pin is a
fixed point of the operator ∆pinN . (b) holds because ∆
pin
N is a contraction. Thus we have
d(Vpin ,Gn)≤ ‖Fpin −Fn‖ ≤ ‖F
n+1−Fn‖
1−β . (38)
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And finally we have:
d(Vpin ,V∗)≤ 1
N
(
1−βn
1−β
)
+βn +
‖Fn+1−Fn‖
1−β . (39)
To finish up, we need the following result:
Lemma 8.
‖Fn+1−Fn‖ ≤ d(Gn+1,Gn).
Proof. Let u=Fn+1(p) and v=Fn(p) for some p. Now u is the point of intersection of Gn+1
and the line x= t1+p. v is the point of intersection of the frontier Gn and the line x= t1+p,.
Now suppose that ‖u− v‖∞ > d(Gn+1,Gn). Then either for u, there is no r ∈ Gn such that r 
u+ 1d(Gn+1,Gn) or for v, there is no r ∈ Gn+1 such that r v+ 1d(Gn+1,Gn). Either of the two
cases contradict the definition of d(Gn+1,Gn). Thus ‖u−v‖∞ ≤ d(Gn+1,Gn). 
Finally, by the triangle inequality we have
d(Gn+1,Gn) ≤ d(An+1,An) + d(Gn+1,An+1) + d(Gn,An) (40)
≤ (1−β)βn + 1
N
(
1−βn+1
1−β
)
+
1
N
(
1−βn
1−β
)
. (41)
Combining with (39) we have the result. 
B. Some remarks on Pareto frontiers of closed and convex sets.
The Pareto frontier of a closed set is not necessarily closed. Figure 1 is one example – the upset is
closed, but its Pareto frontier is open. But we can show that the Pareto frontier of a closed and
convex set in R2 is closed.15
Proposition 6. Let V be the lower Pareto frontier of a closed and convex set S in R2. Then V is
closed.
Proof. Suppose that {vn} is a sequence of points in V that converge to some point v. Then
since S is closed, v ∈ S. We will show that v ∈V. Suppose not. Then there is some u∈V such that
u v. Suppose first that u1 < v1 and u2 < v2. Then let = (min(v1 − u1, v2 − u2)/2 and consider
the L2 ball of radius  around v, i.e.
Bv() = {y ∈R2 : ‖y−v‖2 ≤ }.
Then for any point y in Bv(), we have that u y. But since {vn} converges to v, there exists some
point in the sequence that is in Bv(), and u is dominated by this point, which is a contradiction.
15 Of course, the Pareto frontier of a closed set may be empty, e.g., {(x, y) ∈R2 : x= y}, in which case it is trivially
closed.
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Hence either u1 = v1 or u2 = v2. Suppose w.l.o.g. that u1 < v1 and u2 = v2. See Figure 20. Let
δ= (v1−u1)/2 and consider the ball of radius δ centered at v, i.e. Bv(δ). Let vn be a point in the
sequence such that vn ∈Bv(δ). Now vn,1 > u1 and hence it must be that vn,2 < u2. Now for some
λ ∈ (0,1), consider a point r= λu+ (1− λ)vn such that r1 = u1 + δ. It is possible to pick such a
point since a) v1 = u1 + 2δ and b) |vn,1 − v1| ≤ δ, which together imply that vn,1 ≥ u1 + δ (please
see the figure). Now r∈ S since S is convex. Next r1 = v1− δ < v1, and also r2 <u2 = v2 since λ> 0
𝒗
𝒗𝒏
𝒖 𝜹 𝜹%𝒓
𝜹
Figure 20 Construction in the proof of Proposition 6.
and vn,2 < u2. Let δ
′ = v2− r2. Then consider the ball Bv(δ′) centered at v. Clearly r y for any
y ∈Bv(δ′). But since {vn} converges to v, there exists some point in the sequence that is in Bv(δ′),
and r is dominated by this point, which is again a contradiction. Thus v ∈V. 
Interestingly, this result doesn’t hold for closed and convex sets in RK for K > 2. A counterex-
ample can be found in Kruskal [28]. A variant of this counterexample is depicted in Figure 21 for
completeness. The closed and convex set S is a solid 3-dimensional cone with apex (0,0,1) and base
being the semicircular disc defined by the set {(x, y, z) ∈R3 : x= 5, (y− 1)2 + (z− 1)2 ≤ 1, z ≤ 1}.
The sequence (vn)n∈N lies on the Pareto frontier of this set as shown in the figure, but it converges
to the point (5,0,1), which dominates the point (0,0,1).
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(𝟎, 𝟎, 𝟏)
𝒗∗ = (𝟓, 𝟎, 𝟏)
𝒗𝒏
S
𝒙
𝒚
𝒛
Figure 21 An example of a compact and convex set in R3 whose Pareto frontier is not closed. The sequence (vn)
on the Pareto frontier converges to the point (5,0,1), which dominates (0,0,1).
C. Solving Linear Program (12).
When V is the lower Pareto frontier of a convex polytope, (12) is a linear program. In this program,
x is a dependent vector and can be eliminated. The only question remains is that of addressing
the constraint Q(b) ∈ V. The vertices of V are a subset of {F(p,Φ(V)) : p ∈ PN}. Thus Q(b) can
be chosen as a convex combination of points in {F(p,Φ(V)) : p ∈ PN}. This introduces H(K,N)
variables for each b∈B along with the constraint that these variables sum to 1, thus contributing
mH(K,N) variables and m constraints. Along with the variables α and t, this makes mH(K,N)+
l + 1 variables in total. And along with the K domination constraints for each b ∈ B and the
constraint that
∑
aαa = 1, this makes Km+m+ 1 constraints in total (ignoring non-negativity
constraints on all variables except t).
Of the H(K,N) variables associated with each b ∈B that determine the point Q(b), we know
that at most K will be non-zero. This sparsity constraint can potentially be utilized to speed up
the computation, although we didn’t attempt to do so in our computations.
D. GPS algorithms.
The GPS algorithms are defined as follows [22]. Let ξ = (1−√1−β2)/β.
1. K=2: Let d be the difference in the cumulative (undiscounted) losses of the leading expert
(the one with the lower cumulative loss) and the lagging expert (the one with the higher loss).
Then at every stage, the algorithm chooses the leading expert with probability 1− (1/2)ξd
and the lagging expert with probability (1/2)ξd.
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2. K=3: For i≤ j, let dij be the difference in the cumulative losses of the expert with the ith
lowest loss and the expert with the jth lowest loss. Then the algorithm chooses the leading
expert with probability 1− ξd12/2− ξd13+d23/6, the second expert with probability ξd12/2−
ξd13+d23/6 and the lagging expert with probability ξd13+d23/3.
